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ABSTRACT. Although this paper constitutes a revision of a paper originally pub- 
lished in 2007 [see note 1), the editors are pleased to republish this paper due to its 
theoretical importance for the critique of Marxism as well the interest it creates for 
establishing the possibility of a new political economy based upon the work of 
Michel Foucault. The paper documents and interrogates the contradictions between 
postmodernism and poststructuralism with Marxism. Starting by documenting the 
crisis of the Left at the start of the twenty-first century, an attempt is made to 
radically critique and reappraise Marxism in a direction set out by Foucault. The 
paper is not so much an attempt to meld Marxism and poststructuralism but rather to 
generate a new poststructuralist historical materialism which still has equality and 
fairness as its central concerns, but which goes beyond the traditional problems of 
Marxism based on its adherence to outmoded methodologies and theoretical modes 
of analysis. Echoing well known critiques of Marxist historical materialism, the paper 
focuses on forms of articulation drawn from the revolution in language influenced 
by post-modernism and by historically more recent post-quantum complexity theories.  
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It is clear, even if one admits that Marx will disappear for now, that he will reappear 
one day. What I wish for is not so much the defalsification and restitution of a true 
Marx but the unburdening and liberation of Marx in relation to party dogma, which 
has constrained it, touted it, and brandished it for so long (Foucault 1998, p. 458). 
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Introduction1 
 
Marxism, we are told by politicians and the popular press is dead. The Left, 
as a historical movement tied to the labor movement, is frozen over, caught 
between the collapse of actually existing communism in Eastern Europe and 
the triumph of global market forces. Union membership in the traditional 
industrial economy in the United Kingdom is dwindling as multinationals 
relocate offshore; even insurance, information, banking and call-centre jobs of 
the “new economy” are increasingly outsourced to India and other emergent 
economies literate in information and computing technology and English. 
China has joined the World Trade Organization and committed itself to a 
post-socialist market economy. At a time of an intensification of inequalities 
between regions and, perhaps more significantly, between North and South – 
between the developed world and the developing world – the Left in Britain, 
the USA and most of Europe seems ideologically gutted by the Third Way 
preoccupation with the social market and with citizenship “responsibilities” 
rather than with traditional concerns of equality and advancing rights. The best 
offer on hand seems to be a socialization of the market and an acknowledge- 
ment of its moral limits. Neoliberalism, in the age of privatization reduces 
the state’s role more and more to one of regulation, rather than provision or 
funding of public services. The US–UK neoliberal model of globalization 
has dominated the world economy and world politics for the last 20 years, 
defining the present crisis of fundamentalisms and restyling imperialism as a 
new age of barbarism. In this age, American-style democracy is exported 
alongside the ideology of “free trade.” Yet many Americans have shifted 
their view since the Vietnam War on whether the USA is a force for good in 
the world or an imperialist power, and this is so despite Bush’s recent 
election victory. Even the philosophers of ‘68 have given way to a new 
breed of fashion-conscious savants, who now turn their attention to extolling 
the virtues of liberal individualism or sneer at the last great generation of 
Left-Nietzscheans, such as Foucault and Derrida. 
The Left has certainly been marginalized and even in the home of Euro- 
pean socialism it seems confused and crisis-ridden. Europe itself is fighting 
to establish a new identity, reshaping its territory through enlargement and 
integration, and desperately competing with the US juggernaut of global 
power and the rising stars of East Asia – not only China, but also Japan, 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea – which seem destined to develop 
a trading bloc at least as powerful as that of the USA and the European 
Union. The traditional Left, wedded to the rise of the industrial working 
class, some observers have remarked, is also tied to its demise. Is the Left 
history? Has it simply become an academic form of analysis or does it have 
the seeds to reconfigure itself as an organizing force once again? 
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In terms of emancipatory futures there are all sorts of oppressions to 
overcome; many of these oppressions have intensified in the neoliberal era. 
The question that Steve Brier asks is: 
 
How do we position ourselves as a movement in relation to all the 
particular forms of oppression experienced by specific communities 
and people, defined by race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation, 
etc., especially at a time when no unified working-class movement 
exists that encompasses these communities and fights to eradicate 
the special injustices they face? (Brier 1999) 
 
The question of unity becomes paramount. Against identity politics and 
certain forms of postmodernism we need to inquire: what is the unifying 
principle? Is it the concept of “class” or even an overlapping set of concepts? 
Brier was writing at a time that had not yet seen the neoconservative hegem- 
ony in the White House or its consolidation after the re-election of Bush for 
a second term. In this environment of voter fraud and corporate corruption it 
is difficult to see the flourishing of social democracy even though the White 
House wants to export American-style democracy to the world as part of its 
neoconservative agenda. In these circumstances is it really enough to talk of 
“beyond left and right” as the future of radical politics as Tony Giddens 
(1994) has done? Or does Alex Callinicos’s (2003) Anti-Capitalist Manifesto 
define a way forward? 
These are weighty questions that do not admit easy answers. But it is 
clear that even in this environment of world politics there are new lines of 
struggle emerging that coalesce with the old articles of faith. There are 
expressions of new forms of socialism that revolve around the international 
labor movement and invoke new imperialism struggles based on the move- 
ments of indigenous and radicalized peoples. There are active social move- 
ments, perhaps less coherent but every bit as powerful as older class-based 
movements, such as the anti-capitalism, anti-globalization movements, women’s 
and feminist movements, and environmental movements. These new expres- 
sions do require engagement and re-theorizing by the Left. One obvious 
challenge for Marxism and the Left more generally is its engagement with 
Islam and the enslavement of women. 
There is also a host of struggles around the socialization of the market and 
a question of whether this can be pursued successfully at the level beyond 
the state. Indeed, as many theorists have asserted, the future of the Left is 
tied up with the future of world democracy and with the development of left 
media cultures and centers. Part of the success of the Right has been its 
ability to privatize thinking and media, moving beyond the academy to set 
up dozens of new think tanks, private consultancies, and media centers that 
propagate partisan “news” or lobby and influence government departments at 
the highest levels. 
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Marx’s Radical Political Economy 
 
This essay seeks to ask to what extent Foucault can provide a different vision 
of radical politics to that of Marx, and then to assess the implications of this 
for work in education, politics and ethics. Central to Marx’s model of political 
economy was a particular materialist inversion of the Hegelian dialectic, giving 
rise in Western Marxism to a particular formulation of base and superstructure.  
In his Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
(Marx 1971), (hereafter CPE) written in 1859, Karl Marx, as he says, 
examines “the system of bourgeois economy” and he gives a biographical 
account of how he first came to realize the position he adopts on the issue of 
the relationship of the economy to the cultural, educational, legal and polit- 
ical domains of society – a fundamental and stunning insight whose force has 
not diminished even though the sophistication of structuralist and poststruc- 
turalist arguments against the rudiments of a base/superstructure model now 
have to be accepted. He indicates that he had started thinking about these 
issues in 1842 and returned to a fresh examination of Hegelian philosophy of 
law in order to rethink the origins of legal relations and political forms. As his 
massive bibliographical studies across several languages led him to conclude 
legal relations and political forms can not be understood by themselves or as 
a product of the development of the human mind but only in “the material 
conditions of life,” the totality of which Hegel called “civil society” and 
whose “anatomy” Marx argued must be sought in political economy.  
In that remarkable work that took him over 17 years to bring to maturity, 
Marx addresses the question of the method of political economy and is 
clearly influenced in his construction not only by the history of political 
economy and especially the major figures of the eighteenth century (especially 
Smith and Ricardo) but also Charles Darwin from whom he takes a newly 
scientized view of historical evolution. Marx’s view is tantamount to a form 
of historical naturalism, which assumes laws of historical development. 
Marx calls it a “materialist account of history” and Engels shortened it to 
“historical materialism.” Thus, he argues:  
 
Bourgeois society is the most advanced and complex historical 
organization of production. The categories which express its 
relations, and an understanding of its structure, therefore, provide 
an insight into the structure and the relations of production of all 
formerly existing social formations the ruins and component elements 
of which were used in the creation of bourgeois society.2 
 
Clearly his model here is Darwin as well as Hegel. This is confirmed when 
later in the text he argues: “The anatomy of man is a key to the anatomy of 
the ape.” Marx claimed that all history should be thought of as the history of 
class-struggles over surplus-value. Engles described “being determines con- 
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sciousness” as the “law of evolution in human history” equating it with 
Darwin’s “law of evolution in organic nature.” The Origin of Species3 was 
published in 1859 and Marx read it in 1860. Marx believed that Darwin’s 
book “contains the basis in natural history for our views.” In 1861 in a letter 
to Ferdinand Lassalle Marx wrote: 
 
Darwin’s book is very important and serves me as a model for the 
class struggle in history... Despite all deficiencies, not only is the 
death-blow dealt for the first time here to ‘teleology’ in the natural 
sciences, but its rational basis is empirically explained (Marx & 
Engles, 1965, p. 123). 
 
There is an oft quoted story that Marx sought permission to dedicate Das 
Kapital to Charles Darwin who declined the offer but this now seems suspect.4  
Naturalism is the tendency to look upon the material universe as the only 
reality and to reduce all laws to uniformities in nature. To this end it denies 
the dualism of spirit and matter regarding the social and cultural as manifes- 
tations of matter that are governed by its laws. Naturalism, as Quine has sug- 
gested, is the position that there is no higher tribunal for truth than natural 
science itself; scientific method alone must judge the claims of science and 
there is no room for metaphysics or first philosophy. Naturalism is in this 
sense derived from materialism or pragmatism. Historical materialism explains 
changes in human history through material factors, for Marx, economic and 
technological. Where Marx is both a historical materialist and naturalist, 
Foucault is the former (although as we shall see he places no particular 
priority on the economic) but also firmly anti-naturalist when it come to the 
market as we will see in more detail in later sections. Naturalism, like 
empiricism and older forms of materialism which seek to represent the real or 
nature outside of discourse and independent of historicity fail to adequately 
recognize the contingent dimension of knowledge. For Foucault, knowledge, 
like the human subject is always already social and attempts to establish a 
foundation in nature to anchor knowledge or the operations of institutions 
independently of history are not possible. 
For Foucault, also, the Marxist conception of relations between economy 
and superstructures were problematic. In the Marxist conception of historical 
materialism, educational, legal, political institutions, as well as ideologies 
and discourses, are represented as part of the superstructure of society which 
is split from material practices of the economic foundation or base, and are 
determined by it. In the same way, the mental operations of consciousness are 
represented as determined by the material base of society. As Marx (1971, 
pp. 20–21) expresses the point:  
 
In the social production which men carry on they enter into definite 
relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these 
relations of production correspond to a definite stage of develop- 
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ment of their material powers of production. The sum total of 
these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society – the real foundation, on which rise legal and political 
superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social 
consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines 
the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes 
of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their 
existence, but on the contrary, their social existence determines 
their consciousness. 
 
In the twentieth century one of the central issues addressed by western Marx- 
ists has been an attempted resolution and reconceptualization of the nature of 
the relation between the economic base and the cultural superstructure of 
society. In the classical Marxist model both the character of a society’s 
culture and institutions, as well as the direction set for its future development 
are determined by the nature of the economic base, which can be defined as 
the mode of production at a certain stage of development (Williams 1980, p. 
33). The simplest nature of this relation, as Williams (1980, p. 33) tells us, 
was one of “the reflection, the imitation, or the reproduction of the reality of 
the base in the superstructure in a more or less direct way;” that is, a relation 
in which the economic base and specifically the forces of production con- 
stituted the ultimate cause to which the social, legal and political framework 
of the society can be traced back. 
 In the attempt to reformulate Marxism in the twentieth century the economic 
determinist conception is challenged by those who see Marxism as granting 
rather more “independence” or “autonomy” to the superstructures of society. 
Hence a “dialectical” notion of the relation was stressed suggesting a relation 
of reciprocal influence. It was argued that, although the base conditions and 
affects the superstructure, it is in turn conditioned and affected by it. In all 
cases, however, in order to remain as Marxists, the ultimate priority of the 
economic base as the causal determinant of the social character of a society 
was safeguarded by maintaining that the economic factor is “determining in 
the last instance.” Hence, it was maintained that the superstructure had only 
a “relative autonomy,” and the theory of “relative autonomy,” as a shorthand 
designation of the base-superstructure relation, became a central concept of 
twentieth century Marxism. 
All of the Marxist studies on different aspects of education reflected the 
problematic determinism of the relations between the economy and the 
various cultural and ideological aspects of the society. If we consider the 
application of a particular case of Marx’s base-superstructure analysis to 
education one important theme has been an understanding of the schooling 
system as a production system related to capitalism. The best known contem- 
porary form of this kind of application is Bowles and Gintis’ (1976) corres- 
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pondence theory that hypothesizes a set of correspondences between work 
and education at all levels: a subservient workforce, an acceptance of hier- 
archy, and motivated by external rewards.5 In their later work they explain 
their original position as: 
 
…schools prepare people for adult work rules, by socializing people 
to function well, and without complaint, in the hierarchical struc- 
ture of the modern corporation. Schools accomplish this by what we 
called the correspondence principle, namely, by structuring social 
interactions and individual rewards to replicate the environment of 
the workplace (Bowles & Gintis 2001, p. 1). 
 
In this later work they endorse the correspondence principle as more or less 
correct although they also mention shortcomings of the original work. Crit- 
icisms of structural over-determination of the lives of working class kids has 
been explored by Paul Willis (1977) in Learning to Labour and by many 
others at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of 
Birmingham who demonstrate that working class kids choose to fail through 
the development of a counter-culture.  
 
Foucault’s Radical Political Economy 
 
Political economy has a much longer tradition than as used by Marx. The 
Greeks considered it as pertaining to the management of the household of 
the state, as did Jean Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith.6  
Foucault’s sense of the concept must be seen in relation to his way of 
conceptualizing social structure as well as his opposition to Marxism.  In one 
sense, his own conception can be viewed as a form of “new political econ- 
omy.”7 Foucault opposed both the determinism of the base-superstructure model 
as well as the Hegelian monistic conception of society and the Hegelian/ 
Darwinian conception of progressive evolution of history through the unfold- 
ing of the dialectic to the communist utopia. Rather than seek to explain all 
phenomena in relation to a single centre, Foucault is interested rather to 
advance a polymorphous conception of determination in order to reveal the 
play of dependencies in the social and historical process. Hence, in opposition 
to the themes of totalizing history as found in Hegel, Foucault (1978, p. 10) 
substitutes what he calls a “differentiated analysis:” 
 
Nothing, you see, is more foreign to me than the quest for a 
sovereign, unique and constraining form. I do not seek to detect, 
starting from diverse signs, the unitary spirit of an epoch, the general 
form of its consciousness: something like a Weltanschauung….I 
have studied, one after another, ensembles of discourse; I have 
characterized them; I have defined the play of rules, of transfor- 
mations, of thresholds, of remanences. I have established and I 
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have described their clusters of relations. Whenever I have deemed 
it necessary I have allowed systems to proliferate.  
 
In advocating pluralism in place of monism, Foucault believed Marxism to 
reflect theoretical rules inherited from its time of origins. As he says (2001a, 
p. 269): 
 
Marx’s economic discourse comes under the rules of formation of 
the scientific discourses that were peculiar to the nineteenth cen- 
tury…Marxist economics – through its basic concepts and the 
general rules of its discourse – belongs to a type of discursive 
formation that was defined around the time of Ricardo.  
 
A central element of Foucault’s critique of Marxism relates to the notion of 
“totalization.” Essentially, for Foucault, Marxism was not just a “deter- 
ministic” but a “deductivistic” approach. That is, it directs attention not just 
to the primacy of the economy but it seeks to explain the parts of a culture as 
explicable and decodable parts of the whole totality or system represented as 
a closed system. Marxism, claims Foucault, seeks to ascertain “the principle 
of cohesion or the code that unlocks the system explaining the elements by 
deduction” (Thompson 1986, p. 106). This was the approach of Marx took 
from Hegel, which seeks to analyze history and society in terms of “totality,” 
where the parts are an “expression” of the whole – hence the notion of an 
“expressive totality.”  
The dissociation between Marxism, and Foucault’s own position became 
more apparent after Foucault’s turn to genealogy and Nietzsche at the close 
of the 1960s. With his growing interest in genealogy, Foucault became more 
concerned with power and history, and the historical constitution of knowl- 
edge. In this process, there was however, no integrative principle or essence, 
and history was not periodized according to economic stages. If the genealogist 
studies history “he finds that there is ‘something altogether different’ behind 
things: not a timeless and essential secret, but the secret that they have no 
essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from 
alien forms” (Foucault 1977, p. 142) 
 Foucault’s objection to elements of Marxism explicitly reflects his Nie- 
tzschean heritage and his belief that certain aspects of Marxism distorted the 
liberatory potential of the discourse.  
 
The interest in Nietzsche and Bataille was not a way of distancing 
ourselves from Marxism or communism – it was the only path 
towards what we expected from communism (Foucault 2001, p. 
249). 
 
It was in terms of the philosophy of difference and Nietzsche’s conception of 
multiplicities through a rejection of Platonic hierarchies that Foucault enun- 
ciates a theory of discursive formations and rejects Marxist and Hegelian 
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conceptions of history. The utilization of Nietzsche signaled a rupture from 
Marxism in relation to a series of inter-related conceptual, theoretical and 
methodological precepts, including power, knowledge and truth, the subject, 
and the nature of historical change and determination. 
 Nietzsche focused on power in an altogether different way to Marx. In 
“Prison Talk,” Foucault (1980a, p. 47) states: 
 
It was Nietzsche who specified the power relation as the general 
focus, shall we say, of philosophical discourse – whereas for Marx 
it was the productive relation. Nietzsche is the philosopher of power, 
a philosopher who managed to think of power without having to 
confine himself within a political theory in order to do so. 
 
Power, for Nietzsche, was conceived as a relation of forces within an 
analytics of power/knowledge/truth, which became important for Foucault to 
understand in the later 1960s after the publication of The Archaeology of 
Knowledge and his growing friendship with the Parisian Nietzschean Gilles 
Deleuze. Foucault accredits Nietzsche as the source of his interest in the 
question of truth and its relation to power. As he states, in “Truth and Power” 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 133), “The political question…is not, error, illusion, 
alienated consciousness or ideology, it is truth itself. Hence, the importance 
of Nietzsche.” Nietzsche’s importance to Foucault can be seen as “correct- 
ing” the Marxism developed after Marx, especially in relation to the linkage 
between power-knowledge-truth, and the functioning of knowledge as an 
instrument of power. As Alan Schrift (1995, p. 40) notes, Nietzsche’s 
influence drew attention away from “substances, subjects and things, and 
focused attention instead on the relations between these substantives.” In a 
related way, Foucault “draws our attention away from the substantive notion 
of power and directs our attention instead to the multifarious ways that 
power operates through the social order” (1995, p. 40). For Nietzsche, such 
relations were relations of forces. Foucault thus focused on new relations as 
the relations of forces that existed and interacted within social systems as 
social practices. These were forces of repression and production that charac- 
terized the disciplinary society; forces that enable and block; subjugate and 
realize, and normalize and resist. In this model, power is not a thing, but a 
process, a becoming. 
 Foucault rejects Marxist models of a determining economic base and a 
determined superstructure as well as refinements based on conceptions of 
totality by Marx’s twentieth century successors. Foucault is not interested in 
accounting for the practices of the social structure solely in terms of a model 
of economic determination. Although, like Althusser, he utilizes a model of 
complex and multiple causation and determination within the social structure, 
the specific elements and mechanisms of such processes, as elaborated by 
Foucault, differ in important, indeed crucial, respects. In Foucault’s concep- 
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tion of social structure, explaining the relations between discursive formations 
and non-discursive domains (institutions, political events, economic practices 
and processes) is recognized as the ultimate objective. As he formulates it in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972), for archaeology, in comparison to 
Marxism:  
 
The rapprochements are not intended to uncover great cultural 
continuities, nor to isolate mechanisms of causality . . . nor does it 
seek to rediscover what is expressed in them . . . it tries to deter- 
mine how the rules of formation that govern it . . . may be linked 
to non-discursive systems: it seeks to define specific forms of 
articulation (Foucault, 1972, p. 162).  
 
Unlike Marxists, he sees no one set of factors as necessarily directing human 
destiny. Rather, the forms of articulation and determination may differ in 
relation to the relative importance of different non-discursive (material) fac- 
tors in terms of both place and time. In the shift from a purely archaeological 
to a genealogical mode of enquiry, Foucault’s concern with the relation 
between discursive and non-discursive domains is given a more historical and 
dynamic formulation, although, the concern with synchronic analysis is not 
abandoned. Throughout, however, as Mark Poster (1984, pp. 39–40) explains, 
Foucault’s central aim is to provide a version of critical theory in which the 
economic base is not the totalizing centre of the social formation, whereby 
Hegel’s evolutionary model of history is replaced by Nietzsche’s concept of 
genealogy, and where causes and connections to an imputed centre or 
foundation are rejected in favor of exposing the contingency and transitory 
nature of existing social practices. In Poster’s (1984, pp. 39–40) view, this 
presents us with a crucial decision. In comparing Foucault and Althusser, he 
maintains that “the theoretical choice offered by these two theorists is dra- 
matic and urgent. In my opinion Foucault’s position in the present context is 
more valuable as an interpretative strategy. . . Foucault’s position opens up 
critical theory more than Althusser’s both to the changing social formation 
and to the social locations where contestation actually occurs.” While having 
a generally historicized view of the nature and development of knowledge, 
Foucault rejects the possibility of any “absolute” or “transcendental” con- 
ception of truth “outside of history” as well as of any conception of “objective” 
or “necessary” interests which could provide a necessary “Archimedean 
point” to ground either knowledge, morality or politics. Read in this way, 
historical materialism does not prioritize the economy in any necessary or 
universal sense, but is about the systematic character of society and how it 
might change. It is about the processes of change internal to social systems. 
It holds that societies are to varying extents integrated systematically through 
their material practices and discursive coherences, and break down and 
change as the component elements of the system change.8  
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Governmentality Studies 
 
Based upon this general social ontology Foucault utilizes the notion of “gov- 
ernmentality” as the basis of his “new” conception of political economy. The 
working premise of governmentality studies is based on Foucault’s insight and 
analysis of the modern regime of power in which power characteristically 
operates internally or subjectively in terms of a logic of “self-improvement” 
that demands the freedom of the individual. Governmentality is the key 
concept that links Foucault genealogy of the subject with his interest in 
political rationalities, i.e., between the government of the State and the 
government of the self, and in so doing “solves” the problem of agency 
(liberal political economy) versus structure (Marxist political economy). 
Foucault’s overriding interest was not in “knowledge as ideology,” as 
Marxists would have it, where bourgeois knowledge, say, modern liberal 
economics was seen as false knowledge or bad science. Nor was he interested 
in “knowledge as theory” as classical liberalism has constructed disinterested 
knowledge, based on inherited distinctions from the Greeks, including Platonic 
epistemology and endorsed by the Kantian separation of schema/content that 
distinguishes the analytic enterprise. Rather Foucault examined practices of 
knowledge produced through the relations of power.9 He examined how these 
practices, then, were used to augment and refine the efficacy and instru- 
mentality of power in its exercise over both individuals and populations, and 
also in large measure helped to shape the constitution of subjectivity. Fun- 
damental to his governmentality studies was the understanding that Western 
society professed to be based on principles of liberty and the Rule of Law 
and said to derive the legitimation of the State from political philosophies 
that elucidated these very principles. Yet as a matter of historical fact, 
Western society employed technologies of power that operated on forms of 
disciplinary order or were based on biopolitical techniques that bypassed the 
law and its freedoms altogether. As Colin Gordon (2001, p. xxvi) puts it so 
starkly: Foucault embraced Nietzsche as the thinker “who transforms Western 
philosophy by rejecting its founding disjunction of power and knowledge as 
myth.” By this he means that the rationalities of Western politics, from the 
time of the Greeks, had incorporated techniques of power specific to Western 
practices of government, first, in the expert knowledges of the Greek tyrant 
and, second, in the concept of pastoral power that characterized ecclesiastical 
government.  
It is in this vein that Foucault examines government as a practice and 
problematic that first emerges in the sixteenth century and is characterized 
by the insertion of economy into political practice. Foucault (2001, p. 201) 
explores the problem of government as it “explodes in the sixteenth century” 
after the collapse of feudalism and the establishment of new territorial States. 
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Government emerges at this time as a general problem dispersed across quite 
different questions: Foucault mentions specifically the Stoic revival that 
focused on the government of oneself; the government of souls elaborated in 
Catholic and Protestant pastoral doctrine; the government of children and the 
problematic of pedagogy; and, last but not least, the government of the State 
by the prince. Through the reception of Machiavelli’s The Prince in the 
sixteenth century and its rediscovery in the nineteenth century, there emerges 
a literature that sought to replace the power of the prince with the art of 
government understood in terms of the government of the family, based on 
the central concept of “economy.” The introduction of economy into political 
practice is for Foucault the essential issue in the establishment of the art of 
government. As he points out, the problem is still posed for Rousseau, in the 
mid-18th century, in the same terms – the government of the State is modeled 
on the management by the head of the family over his family, household and 
its assets. 
It is in the late sixteenth century, then, that the art of government receives 
its first formulation as “reason of state” that emphasizes a specific rationality 
intrinsic to the nature of the state, based on principles no longer philosophical 
and transcendent, or theological and divine, but rather centered on the 
problem of population. This became a science of government conceived of 
outside the juridical framework of sovereignty characteristic of the feudal 
territory and firmly focused on the problem of population based on the modern 
concept which enabled “the creation of new orders of knowledge, new 
objects of intervention, new forms of subjectivity and … new state forms” 
(Curtis, 2002, p. 2). It is this political-statistical concept of population that 
provided the means by which the government of the state came to involve 
individualization and totalization, and, thus, married Christian pastoral care 
with sovereign political authority. The new rationality of “reason of state” 
focused on the couplet population-wealth as an object of rule, providing 
conditions for the emergence of political economy as a form of analysis. 
Foucault investigated the techniques of police science and a new bio-politics,  
 
which tends to treat the ‘population’ as a mass of living and co-
existing beings, which evidence biological traits and particular kinds 
of pathologies and which, in consequence, give rise to specific 
knowledges and techniques (Foucault 1989, p. 106, cited in Curtis, 
2002).  
 
As Foucault (2001) comments in “The Political Technology of Individuals,” 
the “rise and development of our modern political rationality” as “reason of 
state,” that is, as a specific rationality intrinsic to the state, is formulated 
through “a new relation between politics as a practice and as knowledge” (p. 
407), involving specific political knowledge or “political arithmetic” (statistics); 
“new relationships between politics and history,” such that political knowl- 
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edge helped to strengthen the state and at the same time ushered in an era of 
politics based on “an irreducible multiplicity of states struggling and com- 
peting in a limited history” (p. 409); and, finally, a new relationship between 
the individual and the state, where “the individual becomes pertinent for the 
state insofar as he can do something for the strength of the state” (p. 409). In 
analyzing the works of von Justi, Foucault infers that the true object of the 
police becomes, at the end of the eighteenth century, the population; or, in 
other words, the state has essentially to take care of men as a population. It 
wields its power over living beings, and its politics, therefore has to be a 
biopolitics (p. 416). 
Foucault’s lectures on governmentality were first delivered in a course he 
gave at the Collège de France, entitled Sécurité, Territoire, Population, 
during the 1977–78 academic year. While the essays “Governmentality” and 
“Questions of Method” were published in 1978 and 1980, respectively, and 
translated into English in the collection The Foucault Effect: Studies in Gov- 
ernmentality (Burchell et al., 1991), it is only very recently that the course 
itself has been transcribed from original tapes and published for the first time 
(Foucault, 2004a), along with the sequel Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours 
au Collège de France, 1978–1979 (Foucault, 2004b).10 The governmentality 
literature in English, roughly speaking, dates from the 1991 collection and 
has now grown quite substantially (see, for example, Miller and Rose, 1990; 
Barry et al., 1996; Dean, 1999; Rose, 1999).11 As a number of scholars have 
pointed out Foucault relied on a group of researchers to help him in his 
endeavors: François Ewald, Pasquale Pasquino, Daniel Defert, Giovanna 
Procacci, Jacques Donzelot, on governmentality; François Ewald, Catherine 
Mevel, Éliane Allo, Nathanie Coppinger and Pasquale Pasquino, François 
Delaporte and Anne-Marie Moulin, on the birth of biopolitics. These research- 
ers working with Foucault in the late 1970s constitute the first generation of 
governmentality studies scholars and many have gone on to publish signif- 
icant works too numerous to list here. In the field of education as yet not a 
great deal has focused specifically on governmentality.12 
Gordon (2001, p. xxiii) indicates three shifts that took place in Foucault’s 
thinking: a shift from a focus on “specialized practices and knowledges of 
the individual person” “to the exercise of political sovereignty exercised by 
the state over an entire population;” the study of government as a practice 
informed and enabled by a specific rationality or succession of different ration- 
alities; and, the understanding that liberalism, by contrast with socialism, 
possessed a distinctive concept and rationale for the activity of governing. 
Liberalism and neoliberalism, then, for Foucault represented distinctive in- 
novations in the history of governmental rationality. In his governmentality 
studies Foucault focused on the introduction of economy into the practice of 
politics and in a turn to the contemporary scene studied two examples: 
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German liberalism during the period 1948–62, with an emphasis on the 
Ordoliberalism of the Freiburg School, and American neoliberalism of the 
Chicago School. Foucault’s critical reading of German neoliberalism and the 
emergence of the “social market” has significance not only for understand- 
ing the historical development of an economic constitution and formulation 
of “social policy” (and the role of education policy within it), but also the 
development of the European social model, more generally, and the con- 
tinued relevance for Third Way politics of the “social market economy.” 
 
Neoliberalism and the Birth of Biopolitics 
 
Naissance de la biopolitique (Foucault, 2004b) consists of thirteen lectures 
delivered by Foucault at the Collège de France (10 January–4th April, 1979). 
It is helpful to see this course in the series of thirteen courses he gave from 
1970 to 1984. The first five courses reflected his early work on knowledge in 
the human sciences, concerning punishment, penal and psychiatric institutions: 
“La Volonté de savoir” (1970–71), “Théories et Institutions pénales” (1971–
72), “La Société punitive” (1972–73), “Le Pouvoir psychiatrique” (1973–74), 
“Les Anormaux” (1974–75). The remaining eight courses focused squarely 
on governmentality studies, with a clear emphasis also on the problematic 
(and hermeneutics) of the subject and the relation between subjectivity and 
truth: “It faut défender la société” (1975–76), “Securité, Territoire, Popula- 
tion” (1977–78), “Naissance de la biopolitique” (1978–79), “Du gouvernement 
des vivants” (1979–80), “Subjectivité et Vérité” (1980–81), “L’Herméneutique 
du subjet” (1981–82), “Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres” (1982–83), 
“Le Gouvernement de soi et des autres: le courage de la verite” (1983–84). 
Even from this list of courses is become readily apparent that the question of 
government concerns Foucault for the last decade of his life and that for his 
governmentality studies, politics were inseparable in its modern forms both 
from biology – biopower and the government of the living – and truth and 
subjectivity. It is important to note that these same concerns in one form or 
another enter into Foucault’s formulations in Naissance de la biopolitique.13 
The Ordoliberalen14 comprised a group of jurists and economists in the 
years 1928–1930 who published in the yearbook Ordo. Amongst their num- 
bers were included William Röpke, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Alexander 
Rüstow, Alfred Müller-Armack and others. Preaching the slogan that “in- 
equality is equal for all” they devised a social market economy influencing 
the shaping of West German economic policy as it developed after the war.  
Foucault refers to these Ordoliberalen as the “Freiberg School” who had 
some affinities (of time and place) with the Frankfurt School but were of a 
very different political persuasion. While they held that Nazism was a con- 
sequence of the absence of liberalism, they did not see liberalism as a 
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doctrine based upon the natural freedom of the individual that will develop 
by itself of its own volition. In fact, for the “Freiberg School” the market 
economy was not an autonomous, or naturally self-regulating entity at all. As 
a consequence, their conception of the market and of the role of competition, 
says Foucault, is radically anti-naturalistic. Rather than the market being a 
natural arena which the state must refrain from interfering with, it is rather 
constituted and kept going by the state’s political machine. Similarly, com- 
petition is not a natural fact which emerges spontaneously from human social 
intercourse, as a result of human nature, but must be engineered by the state. 
As a consequence of this, the traditional distinction between a sphere of 
natural liberty and a sphere of government intervention no longer holds, for 
the market order and competition are engineered by the practices of govern- 
ment. Both the state and the market are on this conception artificial and both 
presuppose each other. In Foucault’s view such a conception means that the 
principle of laissez-faire, which can be traced back to a distinction between 
culture (the artificial state) and nature (the self-regulating market), no longer 
holds. For the Ordoliberalen, the history of capitalism is an institutional, 
non-natural, history. Capitalism is a particular contingent apparatus by which 
economic processes and institutional frameworks are articulated. Not only is 
there no “logic of capital” in this model, but the Ordoliberalen held that the 
dysfunctions of capitalism could only be corrected by political-institutional 
interventions which they saw as contingent historical phenomena. What this 
means, says Foucault, is that the Ordoliberalen support the active creation of 
the social conditions for an effective competitive market order. Education thus 
becomes pivotal in this constructivism. Not only must government block and 
prevent anti-competitive practices, but it must fine-tune and actively promote 
competition in both the economy and in areas where the market mechanism 
is traditionally least prone to operate. One policy to this effect was to 
“universalize the entrepreneurial form” (Lemke, 2001, p. 195) through the 
promotion of an enterprise culture, premised, as Foucault put it in a lecture 
given on 14th February 1979, on “equal inequality for all” (Lemke, 2001, p. 
195). The goal here was to increase competitive forms throughout society so 
that social and work relations in general assume the market form i.e., exhibit 
competition, obey laws of supply and demand. In the writings of Rüstow, 
this was called “vital policy” (“Vitalpolitik”) which described policies geared 
to reconstructing the moral and cultural order to promote and reward entre- 
preneurial behavior, opposing bureaucratic initiatives which stifle the market 
mechanism. To achieve such goals, the Ordoliberalen also advocated the 
redefining of law and of juridical institutions so that they could function to 
correct the market mechanism and discipline non-entrepreneurial behavior 
within an institutional structure in accordance with, and supported by, the 
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law. In this sense, the Ordoliberalen were not simply anti-naturalist, but con- 
structivist. 
In his analysis of neoliberalism, Foucault also directs his attention to the 
Chicago School of Human Capital theorists in America, focusing particularly 
on the works of Gary Becker. These neoliberals also opposed state interven- 
tionism when it was bureaucratic and supported it when it fostered and 
protected economic liberty. For Human Capital theorists the concern was the 
uncontrolled growth of the bureaucratic apparatus as a threat to the freedom 
of the individual. Foucault sees the major distinction between the German 
and US neoliberals existing in the fact that in the US neoliberalism was 
much less a political crusade as it was in Germany or France, for in the US 
the critique was centrally directed against state interventionism and aimed to 
challenge the growth of the state apparatus. In his lecture of March 28, 1979, 
Foucault discusses Hayek and von Mises (whom he labels as the “inter- 
mediaries of US neoliberalism”), Simons, Schultz, Stigler and Gary Becker, 
whom he says is the most radical exponent in the US. The US neoliberals saw 
the Ordoliberalen as representing the political as being above and outside 
the market but constantly intervening to correct its bureaucratic dislocations.  
From their viewpoint, they wanted to extend the market across into the social 
arena and political arenas, thus collapsing the distinction between the eco- 
nomic, social and political in what constitutes a marketization of the state.   
As Foucault sees HCT, it is concerned with the problem of labor in eco- 
nomic theory. While classical political economy claimed that the production 
of goods depended upon real estate, capital, and labor, neo-liberals held that 
only real estate and capital are treated appropriately by the classical theory, 
and that labor needs greater illumination as an active, rather than as a 
passive, factor in production. In this sense neoliberals concurred with Marx 
that classical political economy had forgotten labor and thereby they mis- 
represent the process of production. In order to correct this deficiency, 
neoliberals theorize the role and importance of labor in terms of a model of 
human capital. In essence their theory starts with the human individual in 
terms of a classification of skills, knowledge and ability. Although, unlike 
other forms of capital, it cannot be separated from the individual who owns 
these resources, they nevertheless constitute resources which can be sold in a 
market. Becker distinguishes two central aspects to such human capital: (1) 
inborn, physical and genetic dispositions, and (2) education, nutrition, train- 
ing and emotional health. In this model, each person is now an autonomous 
entrepreneur responsible ontologically for their own selves and their own 
progress and position. Individuals have full responsibility over their invest- 
ment decisions and must aim to produce a surplus value. As Foucault puts it 
in his March 14, 1979 lecture, noting the educational implication, they are 
“entrepreneurs of themselves.” 
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Graham Burchell (1996, pp. 23–24) has noted the core distinction between 
classical and neoliberalism. Whereas for liberalism the basis of government 
conduct is in terms of “natural, private-interest-motivated conduct of free, 
market exchanging individuals,” for neoliberalism “the rational principle for 
regulating and limiting governmental activity must be determined by reference 
to artificially arranged or contrived forms of free, entrepreneurial and com- 
petitive conduct of economic-rational individuals.” This means that for neo- 
liberal perspectives, the end goals of freedom, choice, consumer sovereignty, 
competition and individual initiative, as well as those of compliance and 
obedience, must be constructions of the state acting now in its positive role 
through the development of the techniques of auditing, accounting and man- 
agement. It is these techniques, as Barry, Osborne and Rose (1996, p. 14) put 
it: 
 
[that] enable the marketplace for services to be established as 
‘autonomous’ from central control. Neo-liberalism, in these terms, 
involves less a retreat from governmental ‘intervention’ than a re-
inscription of the techniques and forms of expertise required for 
the exercise of government. 
 
Notwithstanding this rather crucial difference between the two forms of lib- 
eralism, the common element expresses a distinctive concern. For both classical 
liberalism as well as neoliberalism, what defines this concern is a common 
orientation concerning “the limits of government in relation to the market” 
(Burchell, 1996, p. 22).   
In addition to a common priority concerning the scope of the market, both 
classical liberalism and neoliberalism share common views concerning the 
nature of the individual, as rational self-interested subjects. In this perspective 
the individual is presented as a rational optimizer and the best judge of 
his/her own interests and needs. Being rational was to follow a systematic 
program of action underpinned and structured according to rules. The rules 
were rendered coherent and permissible in relation to the “interests” of the 
individual.   
In summary, then, central to neoliberals such as the Ordoliberalen and 
Public Choice theorists, the state actively constructs the market. Far from 
existing within a protected and limited space, market relations now extend to 
cover all forms of voluntary behavior amongst individuals. Rather than 
absenting itself from interfering in the private or market spheres of society, 
Foucauldian political economy points out that in the global economic era 
neoliberalism becomes a new authoritarian discourse of state management 
and control. Rather than being a form of political bureaucracy, which Weber 
(1921) saw as the supreme form of modernist rationality, neoliberalism con- 
stitutes a new and more advanced technology of control. It is both a substan- 
tive political doctrine of control and a self-driving technology of operations. 
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It incorporates both more flexible and more devolved governmental steering 
mechanisms than does bureaucracy. If, for Weber, bureaucracy constituted 
large scale organization comprising a hierarchy of offices and lines of control, 
enabling efficiency, predictability, calculability and technical control, then 
neoliberalism, while incorporating these factors, goes beyond them to enable 
an extension of control in more devolved forms and in more flexible systems. 
This enables the function of control to be differentiated from the function of 
operations, or to use Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) metaphor, “steering” 
from “rowing.” It points to a more effective means of social engineering and 
control than classical bureaucracy, scientific management, or the Fordist 
assembly line. Its overall rationale is to measure the costs of, and place a 
monetary or market value on, all forms of human activity in order to render 
it controllable. It extends the market mechanism from the economic to the 
political to the social. Market exchanges now encapsulate all forms of 
voluntary behavior amongst individuals.15 
 
Towards a Possible Foucauldian Politics 
 
If Foucault is critical of neoliberalism as being a new form of superstructural 
sociology, in many ways highlighting a new operating model of capitalism in 
a global era, his model of political economy also supports, and has affinities 
to, a particular approach to economics and politics that can be represented to 
tie in closely with “regulation school” approaches developed by writers like 
Michel Aglietta, Hughes Bertrand, Robert Boyer, Alan Lipietz and Jacques 
Mistral. Aglietta has commented directly on Foucault’s contribution in his 
conversations with Francois Dosse (1997, p. 291) where he describes Fou- 
cault’s importance as being “because he raised questions about institutions 
and gave answers.” Furthermore, as Dosse explains, Aglietta was especially 
influenced by Foucault’s:  
 
concern for micropowers, his shift from the centre to the peripheral, 
his pluralization of a polymorphous power that corresponded to 
the regulationists’ desire to reach intermediary institutional bodies.  
Moreover, Foucault had made it possible to take some distance 
from ‘the fundamental conception of Marxism’ and to understand 
that this smooth growth curve depended on a system of conciliation 
and a concentration of interests. Until then, the antagonoism between 
capitalists and workers was considered irreconciliable. (Dosse, 
1997, p. 291) 
 
The “regulationists” rendered structuralism dynamic and bought microstruc- 
tures and human beings back into the orbit of the analysis. As well as 
incorporating much from the tradition of Marxism, they were also influenced 
by Keynesian economics through the consideration of real demand, and by 
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arguing for a consideration of money as an institution, and work as a rela- 
tionship rather than a market. Robert Boyer (1986) and Alain Lipietz (1983, 
1995) also accepted a “broad church” conception of the regulationist approach, 
distancing themselves from the more specific variations that also developed 
(see Dosse, 290–294). 
 Central to the regulation school approach was its rejection of the market 
order as a self-regulating entity, and its “openness to social and historical 
elements” (Dosse, 1997, p. 292). This presents the future as an always 
existing constellation of dangers, and has enormous implications for ethics 
and education. As with Foucault there was an appropriation of some features 
of Marxism (especially Althusserianism), a conception of holism/particular- 
ism; an appreciation that the laws governing economic tendencies are his- 
torically contingent, and a concern for institutional forms of power as they 
arose from divergent conflicts or from market processes. The emphasis on 
historicity meant that there was no recognition of predetermined universal 
categories or systems such as forces of production, in preference for a 
recognition of the historical variability of other economic institutions, such 
as money or markets. What resulted was a reinterpretation of economic phe- 
nomena in terms of dynamic schemas as responding to dynamic mecha- 
nisms. Individual behaviors and identities were forged out of complex 
wholes, hence individual behaviors and subjects were viewed in ways that 
did not embody methodological individualism, enabling a reintroduction of 
individuals in relation to groups and social categories. 
 
From Governmentality to the Hermeneutics of the Self as Education 
 
The distinctiveness of Foucault’s emerging problematic of governmentality, 
formulated in the years 1978–79, also developed in a series of subsequent 
themes as “the government of the living,” “subjectivity and truth,” and “the 
government of self and others.” These themes were also of relevance to 
education as a practice of struggle and engagement, and as such help us to 
understand the differences between a Foucauldian political economy of praxis, 
and that of Marxism. Of particular significance here are the themes on the 
problematic (and hermeneutics) of the subject and the relation between sub- 
jectivity and truth. These indeed signify a different relation between individual 
and collective in Foucault’s work, compared to Marxism or Hegelianism. 
Although the individual subject is a product of social conditioning, they are 
always “free standing” in the sense they are never completely confined or 
defined by the determining structures from which they derive. Every conver- 
gence around culture or conditioning is also characterized by difference on 
the grounds that experience within space and time is itself both individuat- 
ing and educative. Thus, while each individual is the product of class and 
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culture each also has a situated and dated uniqueness. As Jane Bennett (1996, 
p. 660) states, citing Foucault: 
 
There is no escaping a regime of power, but this does not mean 
that subjectivation is simply subjection, for there is always the 
possibility of ‘practices of liberation, of freedom, as in Antiquity, 
starting of course from a certain number of rules, styles and con- 
ventions that are found in the culture.’ (Bennett is citing Foucault, 
1989a, p. 313) 
 
This theorisation of the individual within the whole as something which both 
reflects and yet exceeds it, is distinctive of Foucault correction to Marxism, 
forcefully expressed in theoretical terms in works such as The Archaeology 
of Knowledge (1972). 
Another difference from Marxism, springing from the rejection of Hegelian 
conceptions of a unilinear and progressive history is Foucault’s distain for 
utopian ideas which aim for the realization of a perfected or harmonious 
future society. To aim for a specific ordered ideal written “only on paper” as 
something that could exist harbors dangers associated with both “radical and 
global” forms of theorizing. Foucault (1984a, p. 46) echoes liberal concerns 
with utopian engineering when he states that: 
 
we know from experience that the claims to escape from the system 
of contemporary reality so as to produce the overall programs of 
another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, 
another vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most 
dangerous traditions.  
 
Foucault puts more emphasis on local struggle and resistance on the basis 
that existing historical discursive systems (such as those concerning liberty, 
rights, democracy, etc) which can be seen already – in the present horizon – 
to harbor a “repressed” or “sedimented” utopian vision. Such existing dis- 
courses which always operate in local sites can be seen to constitute the 
complex outcome of struggles in history. And it is in this sense that local 
struggles can be seen as the basis of revolutionary activity. For Foucault, the 
revolution as Marxism conceived it as a single historical act of violence and 
transformation fails theoretically to be plausible in a global age because it can 
only be taken seriously within a unilinear and utopian frame of reference. 
What must be asked anew is how would such an idea of revolution can be 
conceived, planned for, and organized in an age which is both global and 
local. The notion of simultaneous and coordinated action across national 
contexts is no longer feasible in a global and “virtual” world. Indeed, to 
envisage a total sudden reconstruction or reordering of society given the 
dispersed digital character of financial and intelligence networks in advanced 
industrial nations boggles the mind. Hence, for Foucault, in a world which is 
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both global and local the drive for change must take the form of resistance 
and struggle in specific sites, utilizing complex technologies and intellectual 
tools.  
 In addition to operating in specific sites, Foucault also emphasizes the 
tasks of the “specific intellectual” as “sapping power” rather than “proposing 
alternative visions” or “telling people what to do.” A critical interrogation of 
power is thus central as the basis of a critical education. As Foucault (1977b, 
p. 208) explains to Gilles Deleuze: 
 
The intellectual’s role is no longer to place himself ‘somewhat 
ahead and to the side’ in order to express the stifled truth of the 
collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that 
transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of 
‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘discourse.’ In this sense 
theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is 
practice. But it is local and regional …and not totalizing. This is a 
struggle against power, a struggle aimed at revealing and under- 
mining power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to 
‘awaken consciousness’ that we struggle… but to sap power, to take 
power; it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for 
power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A ‘theory’ 
is the regional system of this struggle. 
 
The impossibility of a discrete and total revolution also suggests the fact that 
on some issues and for some groups the revolution as Marxists conceived it 
might be considered in some senses as having already occurred. The theo- 
retical task becomes in identifying those specific aspects or dimensions still 
not corrected such as climate change, the unjustified profits of many large 
multinationals, global inequality, the disadvantages of race, class, disability 
and gender both within societies and globally. The normative standards con- 
stitutive of a good for mankind are already present, in some cases manifest, 
in some repressed, within the existing horizon based upon what is necessary 
for both collective and individual survival. This is to say that complex his- 
torically generated discourses on such things as rights, equality, democracy 
and education for survival, already exist, and constitute the repositories of 
knowledge to become the curriculum for education for global citizenship in 
the future. Such a global polis is a thin, or de-centered community, rather 
than a unified mutuality in Hegel’s sense. It is motivated not by a model of 
the truth, but more pragmatically, by a normative conception of survival 
characterized by a common integrity and flourishing but which may take 
many different forms. Foucault’s fellow Nietzschean thinker, and lifelong 
inspiration, Georges Bataille, theorized the importance of survival as the 
pragmatic source and guide of ethics and education. For Bataille, like Nietzsche, 
the struggle for survival represents a specifically non-moral yearning once 
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“God is dead,” a goal that stretches out before one, as Bataille (2004, p. 
xviii) puts it, “independently of moral goals or of serving God,” and yet 
paradoxically itself becomes interpreted as a moral obligation, imposing an 
object “that surpasses all others in value” (xvii) and translating as a “demand 
for definite acts” (xvii). As in a complex global world people are inter- 
dependent, individual and collective goals are intertwined: the well-being of 
one is inseparable from the well-being of all. John Dewey’s model of prob- 
lem solving for survival resonates a similar approach. 
It is well known that Marx never theorized the nature of existence in the 
communist utopia in any detail, and he may well have lacked the tools for 
such an analysis,16 but there is reason to believe that he held intuitively to a 
similar conception to Foucault. Foucault sees difference as manifesting itself, 
necessarily, within unity, the latter which is always precarious, always chang- 
ing and never completely predictable. Just for instance, as “Britishness” 
defines a common attribute between a group of people, so within the group, 
and simultaneous or identical with it, there are a myriad of differences, 
pertaining to appearance, gender, age, or what have you. In this sense com- 
monness and difference are co-present features of any phenomena. Within 
the existing horizon of survival, there are many legitimate yet different ways 
to live. It is in this sense also that in place of unilinear conceptions of change 
and causality, Foucault’s model of historical materialism is consistent with 
twentieth century conceptions of complexity theory. New realities, both 
physical and social, manifest themselves as emergent phenomena. While 
there is no necessary equilibrium which produces “happy endings” or “self-
regulated markets,” within limits we can understand the affects that par- 
ticular combinations, alliances and choices entail. Understanding possible 
affects of combinations, and alliances, is indeed the task of education and of 
ethics. To understand education as concerned with a theory of affects, is of 
course to draw off Deleuze, as well as Spinoza and Nietzsche.17 Yet it is an 
extension which we think (or hope) Foucault might approve.18 Certainly it 
extends his thought in a way which brings out the important differences to 
Marxism, in a way related to how ethics and education would be conceived 
to have a role in the new era which is both global and national and which 
confronts a world that still awaits to be transformed. 
The different way individual and collective are related in Foucault com- 
pared to Marxism indeed suggests a new order of ethics. In his later books, 
The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, as Jane Bennett (1996, p. 655) 
explains, Foucault considers ethics as both a “code of morality” and in 
relation to “subjectivation.” As a “code morality,” ethics relates to justified 
moral precepts and rules. Christianity comprised one set of these, yet today, 
the new demands of survival, centering on issues like climate change and the 
health of populations, presents a different set of precepts to guide action. In 
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addition, however, such rules will not dictate or define conduct for each 
individual for every situation. While the tasks and requirements of survival 
will dictate some general, although historically specific, precepts and “rules,” 
different contingent imperatives at different times and places will also operate, 
so the individuals’ mode of ethical comportment will also reflect decisions, 
choices and commitments which only he/she can decide in particular situations. 
For Foucault, as for poststructuralism in general, every action, like every 
statement, has a novel aspect, a situated and dated uniqueness, whereby 
ethical decisions and actions assume great importance for society and for the 
groups and individuals that comprise it. In this sense, as Bennett (1996, p. 
655) explains, “Foucault finds ‘code morality’ insufficient.” She cites Fou- 
cault (1985, p. 28): 
 
In short, for an action to be ‘moral,’ it must not be reducible to an 
act or a series of acts conforming to a rule, or a value. There is no 
moral conduct that does not [also] call for forming of oneself as an 
ethical subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without ‘modes 
of subjectivation’ and an ‘ascetics’ or ‘practices of the self’ that 
support them. 
 
One dimension of Foucault’s writings on ethics that assumes importance for 
education today relates to global activism. This is related to the propensity or 
preparedness of groups and individuals to speak out, take a stand, or to join 
together to protest. Foucault, in his own life, manifested a constant prepared- 
ness and concern with many causes including the rights of prisoners, of 
lawyers who defended radical groups, and of the poor. Hence, he voiced 
concern for the rights of those on the high seas, against piracy, where he 
speaks of “human rights” to “confront governments” which are beyond the 
limits of nationality.19 As he puts it (Foucault, 2001b, p. 474), 
 
There exists an international citizenship that has its rights and its 
duties, and that obliges one to speak out against every abuse of 
power, whoever its author, whoever its victims. After all, we are 
all members of the community of the governed, and thereby obliged 
to show mutual solidarity…. It is the duty of this international 
citizenship to always bring the testimony of people’s suffering to 
the eyes and ears of governments….The suffering of men must 
never be the silent residue of policy. It grounds an absolute right to 
stand up and speak to those who hold power. 
 
Foucault’s approach, as extended through concepts such as parrhésia, and 
contestation and resistance, also supports a model of global democracy and 
the role of grassroots critical social movements, which constitute a “bottom 
up” theory of the democratization of world order, and suggests a conception 
of education as instilling radical global citizenship. Such global protest move- 
ments constitute a check on nation states and put them under an obligation to 
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respect human rights, as well as to refrain from exploiting or persecuting 
individuals within their borders. It creates, also, the conditions where all 
nations actions are monitored, and rendered accountable, at supra-national 
levels, and where each are encouraged to adjust their own regime to accord 
with international standards and principles that have been deemed important 
at this time. Although the Iraq war has set back the cause of constructive 
international relations by decades, undermining the role of the United 
Nations, and having a hugely detrimental affect on producing a viable global 
approach to humanitarian intervention, notwithstanding such setbacks, it is 
towards a stable and just international order that Foucauldian political economy 
strives. 
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NOTES 
 
1. This introduction is based upon an editorial written for a special issue called 
“Marxist Futures” for the journal Policy Futures in Education (Peters, 2004). 
2. References here and below except where otherwise indicated are from web 
site: http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/ 
index/htm (accessed 12th Sept, 2005, transcribed by Tim Delaney. 
3. The full title of Darwin’s masterpiece is On the Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life 
available at http://www.literature.org/authors/darwin-charles/the-origin-of-species/ 
index.html (accessed 13th Sept., 2005).  
4. While Marx did indeed send Darwin a copy of his famous work in second 
edition to Darwin in 1873 it remained uncut on his shelves and there is no evidence 
that he read it. It also seems likely that the source of the myth is a confusion over a 
letter by Darwin published in a Soviet newspaper in 1931 which does not mention 
Marx but declines the offer of a dedication. The letter concerned Edward Aveling’s 
(Marx’s son in law) The Students’ Darwin (Wheen, 1999); see also http://www. 
evowiki.org/index.php/Darwin_and_Marx (accessed 13 Sept., 2005). 
5. See also Bowles & Gintis (2001), “Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited” 
at http://www.umass.edu/preferen/gintis/soced.pdf#search=%22Herbert%20Gintis% 
2C%20Schooling%20in%20Capitalist%20America%3A%20Educational%20Refor
m%20and%22.   
6. Political economy originally in the Greek had three related meanings: oikonomia 
meant the management of a household or family, politike meant pertaining to the 
state; and, ta oikonomika or economics, meant the art of household management. 
Thus political economy originally meant the management of the household of the 
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State. It was used in this sense both by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Adam Smith. 
Rousseau in “A Discourse on Political Economy” in 1755 defines political economy 
as “the government of the State for the common good.” Rousseau says, “The word 
Economy, or OEconomy, is derived from oikos, a house, and nomos, law, and meant 
originally only the wise and legitimate government of the house for the common 
good of the whole family. The meaning of the term was then extended to the govern- 
ment of that great family, the State. To distinguish these two senses of the word, the 
latter is called general or political economy, and the former domestic or particular 
economy” (http://www.constitution.org/jjr/polecon.htm accessed 14 August 2005). 
7. New political economy seeks to combine “the breadth of vision of the classical 
political economy of the 19th century with the analytical advances of twentieth-
century social science;” to overcome old distinctions and divisions of the past 
(agency/structure; state/market) to provide an integrated analysis that draws on a 
range of concepts and methodologies without favoring adherence to one particular 
school, method or theoretical approach. New political economy might draw on a 
range of theory: institutional-organizational approaches in economics; comparative 
theories of institutional and economic change in economics and economic history; 
structuration theory and strategic-relational theory in sociology; critical theories in 
international relations. This is drawn from the Editorial by Andrew Gamble, Anthony 
Payne, Michael Dietrich, Ankie Hoogvelt and Michael Kenny for the journal New 
Political Economy when it was established in 1996. 
8. This paragraph is reformulated from the book by Mark Olssen (2006a), Michel 
Foucault: Materialism and Education, Boulder, Paradigm Publishers. 
9. In his Résumé du cours for 1979 (in Foucault, 2004b: 323) Foucault indicates 
that the method he will adopt is based on Paul Veyne’s nominalist history and in this 
respect he writes: 
 
Et reprenant un certain nombre de choix de méthode déjà faits, j’ai essayé 
d’analyser le <<libéralisme>>, non pas une théorie ni comme une 
idéologie, encore moins, bein entendu, comme une mannière pour la 
<<société>> de <<se\ représenter>>; mais comme une pratique, c’est-à-
dire comme une <<manière de faire>> orientée vers objectifs et se 
régulant par une réflexion continue. Le libéralisme est à analyser alors 
comme principe et méthode de rationalisation de l’exercice de gouvern- 
ement–rationalisation qui obéit, et c’est là sa spécificité, à la règle interne 
de l’économie maximale. 
 
10. The Foucault archives have been relocated from the IMEC (Institut Mémoires 
de l’Édition Contemporaine) Paris address (9, rue Bleue, F-75009 Paris) to Abbaye 
d’Ardenne (14280 Saint Germaine la Blanche-Herbe), email: bibliotheque@imec-
archives.com. <<Il faut défender la société>>, a course Foucault delivered in 1975–
1976, was translated into by David Macey as Society Must Be Defended was pub- 
lished in 2003 by Penguin (Foucault, 2003). While courses for 1977–78, 1978–79, 
as previously mentioned, and 1981–82 (<<L’Herméneutique de sujet>>) have been 
recently published (in the Gallimand/Seuill series), courses for the years 1979–80, 
1980–81, 1982–83, 1983–84 are still only available from the IMEC Foucault archive 
as recorded tapes. Some work has still to be translated. 
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11. The governmentality literature has grown up around the journal Economy and 
Society, and includes the work of Cruickshank, Hindess, Hunter, Larner, Minson, 
O’Malley, Owen, and others, as well as those referred to above, most of who have 
published in Economy and Society (for aims and scope, and table of contents, see 
http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/03085147.asp).  
12. See Olssen, Codd, O’Neill (2004: 167–171); Olssen, 2006: pp. 29–30, 108, 
Ch. 10. Also see “Why Foucault?” (Peters, 2004) where Peters discusses Foucault 
studies in the English-speaking world by reference to the work of Marshall, Olssen, 
Ball, Popkewitz & Brennan, Besley, Baker, Middleton and myself. My work on 
Foucault’s governmentality dates from Peters (1994), with additional work in 1996 
(with Marshall), Peters (1996), Peters (1997), and Peters (2001a, b, c). For additional 
work on Foucault see Peters (2003a & b), Peters (2005a & b). A special issue of 
Educational Philosophy and Theory published a special issue in 2006 entitled “The 
Learning Society and Governmentality” edited by Masschelein, Bröckling, Simons 
and Pongratz.  
13. As he writes in his Résumé du cours (in Foucault, 2004b: 323): 
 
Le thème retenu était doc la <<biopolitique>>: j’entendais par là la 
manière don’t on a essayé, depuis le XVIII siècle, de rationaliser les 
problèmes posés à la pratique gouvenrement par les phénomènes propres 
à une ensemble de vivants constitutes en population: santé, hygiene, 
natalitié, longévité, races… 
 
14. The remainder of this section is reformulated and drawn from Olssen, Codd, 
O’Neill (2004) Education Policy: Globalisation, Citizenship, Democracy. London: 
Sage. 
15. This is the process which Ritzer (2000) describes as the “McDonaldization of 
Society.” 
16. The reason usually given, but which in any case would be consistent with our 
statement here, is that Marx considered theoretical speculation of this sort unsci- 
entific, indeed, utopian, because economic and social conditions would themselves 
change in ways that were unpredictable. 
17. See Deleuze’s (1988) book called Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, where he 
articulates the theory of affects. 
18. Types of affects might include desire, sadness or joy, as they did for Spinoza. 
However, the reader should entertain the possibility that Foucault would quite 
possibly object to this form of theorizing on the ground he eschewed normative 
theorizing of this sort. In extending Foucault in this way, it is thus in the spirit of the 
types of educational possibility and the types of normative theory that we are 
observing might “fit” with his Nietzschean approach. This seems to be a worthwhile 
way to extend Foucault if the possibilities of a Foucauldian radical political economy 
are to be developed. 
19. The occasion for the statement cited here, published in Liberation in June 
1884, was the announcement in Geneva of the creation of an international committee 
against piracy.  
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